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Unitizing
The Roualhj Interests
A Suggestion by Frederick Squires*
Many efforts to improve production practices by better
utilization of reservoir energy collide with the stone wall of
multiple royalty ownership.
In many cases where it is possible to unite the oil produc-
ers because they are relatively few, well informed, and in-
fluenced by intelligent self interest, the royalty owners cannot
be brought together because of their numbers. There are
usually many land interests over a pool, and the royalty trad-
er's practice of buying part or all of the farmer's royalty,
and then often subdividing this by sale to a much greater
number, results in such a multiplication and scattering of hold-
ings that there is no possibility of uniting them. It is to sug-
gest a means to remove this difficulty and to confine the uni-
fication of a pool to the operators alone that this paper is
directed.
Inequalities in Returns Under Separate Lease Operations
Separate royalties do not always, or even often insure to
a land owner his royalty in the same amount of oil which
underlay his farm when he leased it. Figure 1 demonstrates
that the effect of a natural water drive may be to enrich suc-
ceeding farms with oil driven to them from other farms
nearer the source of encroaching water. Even if the contribut-
ing landowner knew that this was happening he could not
compel the operator to stop it. Contributions of part of the
oil which underlay his land to the owners of other tracts are
obviously possible and often provable in normal production
from individual leases. The action of natural underground
forces, such as edgewater invasion or gas-cap expansion,
change the distribution of oil and gas under the farms as pro-
duction proceeds, and since the operator is not responsible
for such natural changes there is no way for the royalty
owner to hold him accountable. If, however, the same result
is accomplished by artificial agencies, such as unequal well
spacing or the injection of water at the edge or gas into the
cap, or both, or unequal varying of production from wells, the
owner of a royalty interest, if it is being depleted, may block
the operation on the ground that it is demonstrable that he is
being unfairly deprived of part of his royalty interest in oil
which underlay his holdings. But since such engineering
processes are productive of more oil for the royalty owners
as a whole, even though some lose and others gain, their use
should be so arranged as to be acceptable to the farmer. The
unitization of the royalty interests in the lease before pro-
duction begins, forming a new kind of farmers' cooperative,
is the way to do it.
Oil Pool Areas Vs. Land Divisions
When Thomas Jefferson divided part of our country into
rectangular townships and sections which settled future land
ownership he had no idea how much trouble and loss he was
?oing to cause oil operators and royalty owners. The same
iifficulty would have resulted from any other uniform system
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of land division. States like Texas and Kentucky, which were
laid out without Jefferson's help, also made plenty of trouble
as did the old French surveys forming long ribbon farms
with narrow footage along winding rivers. Yet surface
divisions having determined the shape of the parcels into
which ownership must fit, determined also the shape of leases,
regardless of the disparity between them and the form of
the oil pool below.
It is obvious that there can be little similarity between
surface ownership divisions and the area of oil pools lying
beneath them; yet the law of capture which gives an operator
the right to own all the oil and gas from a piece of land that
he can bring to the surface of that land, was an attempt to
fit the round peg into the square hole and has complicated
for many years and still complicates the production of oil.
It is now realized that the attempt to capture on each par-
ticular farm all the elusive oil and gas beneath it is not the
way to get the greatest return for either the operator or the
farmer. It is generally agreed that, for best results, the farms
over one pool should be pooled into one farm.
Loss of Production Due to Disunity of Leases
Disunity or separate operation of leases is detrimental
to oil production because it requires strict observance of prop-
erty lines. Individual ownership of royalties hinders efficient
production by dissipating reservoir energy and obstructing
its restoration. (See Figure 2.) It is particularly detrimental:
a. When maintenance of reservoir pressure requires that
edgewater wells be abandoned as producers and used
for injection of water under pressure.
b. When the best interests of the pool require an expan-
sion of the gascap by means of abandoning high gas-
oil ratio wells on the perimeter of the existing gas-
cap and using them for gas injection wells.
c. When the best interests of the pool requires injection
of water and gas conjointly to increase the gas-cap and
contract the contacting edgewater by abandoning edge
gas- and oil-producing wells and converting them into
injection wells.
d. When the pool is producing under natural edgewater
encroachment or natural gas-cap expansion requiring
that intermediate wells be abandoned as producers and
converted to input wells.
e. When the pool is to be developed by secondary recov-
covery through pattern flooding or pattern gas injec-
tion, because:
For best results flooding patterns must be determ-
ined by conditions of permeability, porosity, oil con-
tent, depth to producing stratum, etc., existing in the
particular reservoir, no one of which conditions need
bear any relation to surface ownership divisions, and
almost never does.
For best results proper locations of gas injection
wells and their optimum distances from pumping wells
must also depend on porosity, permeability, etc., and
are also entirely divorced from surface ownership
division. With changes in lateral permeability of the
sand in a single pool, changes in well spacing either for
water or gas are required, and adherence to property
lines restricts and often prohibits such desirable elas-
ticity of layout (Fig. 3).
f. When for best results whole farms should be aban-
doned as producing territory and used for input terri-
tory, or left quiescent as in expanding gas-cap or ad-
vancing edgewater zones.
Benefits From Unitization
When unitization of royalty interests is obtained, the pro-
ducer and the farmer become cooperative partners and the
farmer benefits by the opportunity he has given the producer
to use scientific techniques. The advantages gained by such
cooperation are as follows:
1. Freedom in spacing wells according to geological and engi-
neering investigation rather than property line restrictions.
2. Improvement in average gas-oil ratios, and water-oil ratios,
by shutting in wells before such ratios become wasteful.
3. Freedom to add to a gas-cap and water to edgewater or
both, even when to do so involves abandonment as produc-
ers of wells in border areas.
4. Freedom in selection of patterns and spacing in secondary
recovery and opportunity to vary the pattern in a single
pool to fit variations of its permeability, etc.
5. Proper operation of distillate properties.
Unitization Would Have Helped Illinois Pools
One of the best examples of loss through disunity is the
Devonian production in the Centralia pool. This oil was under
strong water drive and some gas expansion, and it is probable
that had the Devonian pool been unitized the wells would
have flowed during their entire productive life. Instead, wells
are now pumping vast quantities of water at high cost to
obtain small oil production, and the total is unquestionably
much less than could have been obtained by controlled output
of flowing wells.
The Dix pool would be greatly benefitted if it could be
flooded by returning water to its low structure circumference
in the amount of the fluid taken out of its high structure in-
terior, an operation possible only under unit operation.
The central basin McClosky areas, held largely by one com-
pany and susceptible to improvement by flooding, would be
more successfully operated under unitization. This is also true
of many other Illinois
.
pools which are showing edgewater
encroachment, such as Woodlawn and Benton.
The Evolution of Unitization
Long ago Henry L. Doherty advocated the principle of unit-
ization and the movement has been going on since then in many
different ways. Its earliest manifestation was aimed at operat-
ing economy. Producers began to block up holdings by pur-
chase or trade to form larger and therefore more economically
operable properties. This gave them a chance to centralize
machinery and manpower. Power on one farm which pumps
wells on it and other farms, the collection of gas from all
wells in a pool to be treated- at a central gasoline plant, second-
ary recovery compressor plants collecting from and returning
gas to a number of leases marked this tendency. Community
salt water disposal, gas storage, community control of bot-
tom-hole pressures and gas-oil ratios, casing-head back pres-
sures and community gas sampling, and spacing patterns
settled by state regulatory bodies, are further developments
tending toward complete unitization. This centralization is
beneficial to both the operator and the farmer. Also new con-
ceptions of reservoir behavior put emphasis on the retention of
its energy which demonstrated the necessity of unitization.
There has also been an evolution of the concept of the
s interest in oil resources and oil recovery, especially
during the present World War. A war of the magnitude and
character of the present conflict brings home the fact that the
country's resources, although privately owned in the main, are
or may become necessary to the perpetuation of the American
way of life. Therefore from that standpoint also the necessity
of making as complete recovery as possible of our oil resources)
is obvious.
The Time to Unify
The most propitious time to get land owners together is be-
fore production has been found, and the best vehicle to use is
the lease. Because the land owner has much to win and noth-
ing to lose, he is willing to lease, as is evidenced by the general
success of the oil companies in obtaining large, almost unbrok-
en blocks of territory.
The Royalty Unitization Clause in the Lease
Modern leasing moves fast. After an oil company has
formed a favorable opinion of the value of an area, it plans
a whirlwind campaign and leases farms so rapidly that the
great majority are tied up before competitors know what is
going on. This has been true in many areas in Illinois, notably
|
at Louden, Salem, Patoka, and the Central Basin McClosky
area.
It is the belief of the writer that a unitization clause]
should be incorporated in every lease. In the areas mentioned,
FIGURE I
This shows the direction and extent of the movement of water in an edge-
water encroachment on an Illinois oil pool and demonstrates, by the in-
creased production of farms in the direction of the water movement, the
fact that oil from one farm is moved to the next farm and part of it re-
covered there although it did not originally underlie the point of re-
covery. The illustration is used to prove the claim that the old law of
capture presents unfairness to the royalty owner.
FIGURE 2
Fhis is a plan and section through an oil pool and is presented to illus-
trate the advantage of unitization. The pool is under gas-cap expansion
and edgewater encroachment. When the wells on Farms A and B begin
to show, respectively, wasteful ratios of water and gas to oil they may
se shut down as producers and changed into input wells. Although
fhese farms no longer produce oil, they become instruments for the
production of a greater quantity of oil from the pool as a whole. Under
disunity, wells on these farms would be produced under wasteful water-
jil and gas-oil ratios and when no longer able to produce oil in paying
quantities, would be abandoned, which would entail the abandonment
jf the lease, making it impossible to use the territory for input purposes.
eased under such conditions, fairly workable unitized pools
inder one company ownership would have resulted. Had all
;he leases in the same pool used a unitizing clause in their
eases, the principal obstacle to unity would have been elimi-
lated. Since the producing company, even after its prelim-
nary investigation, does not know which, if any, of the leases
vill be productive, whether or not several are destined to pro-
luce, or the order of their value, it is obvious that the indi-
vidual farmer has no reason to be sure of production on his
wn land.
Therefore the essence of the following clause* should ap-
»ear in every lease, as an alternative to the usual royalty
greement wherever state statute's permit:
"Notwithstanding anything in this lease contained to the
contrary, where unit operation of any area, including the
leased premises, or any part thereof, is necessary to comply
with governmental order or action, or when the leased prem-
ises or any part thereof could be more economically devel-
* Quoted from a lease actually in use in the State of Florida.
oped and operated through unit operation, the lessor agrees
that any part or all of the leased premises may be so unitized
or pooled, and in such event the lessor's royalty shall be
based on the per cent of total production from the unitized
area that his acreage included therein bears to the total
acreage of the unitized area, and drilling operations or pro-
duction on any part of such unitized or pooled area, whether
or not on acreage covered by this lease, shall be considered
as drilling operations or production on the leased premises."
It is obvious that such a clause would be beneficial to the
producing company if the other operators unitized, in that it
would require the drilling of fewer wells, both for primary
and secondary operations, would permit the use of natural
reservoir forces as well as the introduction of gas into a gas-
cap, or water into the edge area, or both, and after the area of
production was outlined would allow the drilling and producing
of such wells only as would most efficiently withdraw the oil,
and would allow the abandonment as producers of all wells
detracting from pool efficiency without losing the right to con-
vert such wells when alone on leases into pressure restoring
inputs.
The royalty owners as a class would benefit because unit
operations produce more oil. It is possible that the increased
production due to unitization, would return a royalty partner
in the operation more oil than he would have obtained under
INPUT WELL SPACING DETERMINED BY PROPERTY LINES
FIGURE 3
This shows diagramatically by comparison of maps A and B the differ-
ence in the amount of drilling and consequent expense when secondary
recovery plans are laid out (A) using property lines as the determining
factor under disunity and (B) using spacing determined by permeability
under unitization.
separate development, even were his farm over the richest
part of the pool.
One Big Farm
The underlying idea in unitization is to develop and operate
a pool as though it underlay one big farm instead of many
little ones. Let us assume that there is a ranch of twenty-five
hundred acres owned by 25 partners. The partners have
agreed that they may lease the ranch as a whole or divide it
into twenty-five separate equal tracts, assigned by lot, one to
each partner who may execute a separate lease on his own
tract. There is no doubt that an operator would want a single
lease on the entire property. How should the twenty-five part-
ners look at at? There should be no doubt about the choice of
the landowners. The total amount of oil recovered would be
far greater from one lease than from twenty-five, because
reservoir energy would be used more efficiently and the cost
of operating would be decreased so that the economic limit
would be lower. They should choose the single lease because
by doing so each would be sure to get some return, if oil was
found anywhere on the twenty-five hundred acres. Nobody
would be entirely left out as would be apt to be the case were
the property divided into 25 separate leases.
A moral consideration should guide their decision. Nature
has made them co-owners of pool energy which cannot be
equitably divided between separate owners but can readily
be controlled as a unit to the equal and mutual advantage of
members of the partnership and in the national interest.
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